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Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: 
Changing Copyright to Promote the First Amendment
Values of Transformative Video
I. Introduction
Over the past several years, the Internet has exploded with the growth of
user-generated information.  In 2004, over fifty-three million people,
accounting for forty-four percent of Internet users, uploaded user-created data
or videos onto the Internet.1  One particular video-sharing site, YouTube.com,
has over sixty-five thousand videos uploaded by users to it each day.2  Among
these user creations are a new form of digital expression called video mashups.
Unlike traditional videos, video mashups take several sources of video and
audio and digitally transpose them over each other, thereby creating a video
with an entirely different feel and message than the originals.3  For example,
one might combine numerous video shots and audio samples of President
George Bush, and mash these together with the tune from John Lennon’s
Imagine.4  The resulting video mashup would both criticize President Bush and
express a message different than the messages in any of the source materials.
By creating this video mashup, however, this creator would violate the
copyrights belonging to the copyright holders of every piece of source
material, unless the creator first obtained permission to use these source
materials from the copyright holders.
To the extent that mashups “by definition involve the combination of
someone else’s information or data” into a new creation, they risk infringing
a copyright holder’s derivative rights.5  When an appropriator impinges upon
these rights, creators of the source content can request that a service provider
remove any copyrighted materials from the provider’s website,6 sue an
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10. Yuki Noguchi & Sara Kehaulani Goo, To the Media, YouTube Is a Threat and a Tool,
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2006, at D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
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11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 107 (2004).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
infringer for damages,7 or even seek criminal prosecution.8  Instances of
copyright holders using such methods have already occurred.  In 2004,
purported holders to the copyright of Woody Guthrie’s song This Land Is Your
Land threatened suit against Jib-Jab.com, the creator of a web-based animation
that used the tune from Guthrie’s song to satirize the 2004 presidential
election.9  More recently, online video provider YouTube.com has received
numerous requests to remove videos containing copyrighted works.10
Incidents like these led Prof. Lawrence Lessig to remark that, in terms of
remixing video, the “freedom to build upon the film archive of our culture . . .
is now a privilege reserved for the funny and famous — and presumably
rich.”11
Even though mashups likely constitute copyright infringement, they
nonetheless promote important First Amendment values.  Many mashups
contain strong political and social criticism.12  Additionally, mashups give the
creator a chance to transform previously existing works, while also giving
these works new meaning and relevance.  In this way, mashups contribute to
the marketplace of ideas.  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
largely foreclosed First Amendment protection for mashups by refusing to
protect transformative works as a form of fair use.13
Changes are necessary to United States copyright law in order to protect the
important expression contained within mashups.  Mashups, as transformative
works that require the imagination of their creator, should be recognized for
their contributions to speech, regardless of whether a mashup contains
copyrighted material.  This comment proposes that courts alter existing fair use
doctrines to both find transformation in works such as mashups and give these
transformative works a presumption of fair use in order to enhance the First
Amendment values mashups embody.
Part II of this comment defines the different genres of mashups that mashup
artists are currently creating, while specifically exploring the different types
of expression contained in the subset of mashups known as video mashups.
Part III examines copyright law, including the broad derivative rights that
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14. PCMag.com, Mashup Definition, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=
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15. Id.
16. Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 965.
17. Goo, supra note 3.
18. See Irene E. McDermott, Movement on My Monitor: Video on the Web, SEARCHER,
Sept. 2006, at 17 (noting that mashups can be made from shots of commercial video).
relate to mashups and why the current fair use doctrine ultimately provides
mashups with no protection.  Part IV provides an overview of the two leading
Supreme Court cases that consider copyright’s relation to the First Amendment
and discusses why existing First Amendment doctrines are insufficient to
protect mashups.  Part V considers the various problems, both social and legal,
that arise from denying mashups greater protection from the powers copyright
holders presently possess.  Part VI examines solutions commentators have
proposed to solve copyright problems that are similar to the problems mashups
face, while also analyzing why those proposed solutions are insufficient to
protect the expression in mashups.  Part VII proposes that courts alter the
traditional fair use test to make the test more accommodating to transformative
works.  Specifically, courts must find that works that create new expression are
transformative, and must give transformative works a presumption of fair use.
Part VIII contemplates the benefits of making fair use favor transformation
more heavily.  This comment concludes with Part IX.
II. The Mashup Breakdown
A. Mishmash of Mashups
In the parlance of netspeak, a mashup is some type of digital media
containing “[a] mixture of content or elements.”14  Although relatively new,
the term has gained popularity since 2005.15  Furthermore, while this paper
will generally use the term “mashup” to refer to “video mashup,” it should be
noted that several categories of mashups exist.  Regardless of the terminology
used, all mashups appropriate “images and sounds from our culture”16 and
transform the meaning of the original sources into something different.
1. Video Mashups
Video mashups have been described as “[mixing] original images or sounds
with music, quick-witted narrations or creative transitions.  The result is a
video dialogue of sorts that makes a statement that is political, personal or
merely entertaining.”17  A video mashup need not, however, contain any
original material.18  At its most fundamental level, an author creates a video
mashup merely by “taking content from one medium and ‘mashing in’ content
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2006, at 58.
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21. Goo, supra note 3, at D01.
22. Lessig, supra note 16, at 965.
23. Oser, supra note 19, at 58.
24. Aliya Sternstein, Mashups, FORBES, July 21, 2003, at 145.
25. Derek Chezzi, Tech: Feel Free to Mix and Mash, MACLEAN’S, Sept. 20, 2004, at 81,
available at http://www.macleans.ca/science/technology/article.jsp?content=20040920_88764_
88764.
26. Ben Greenman, The Mouse That Remixed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004, at 24, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/02/09/040209ta_talk_greenman; Dan Hunter & F.
Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951, 987 (2004).
27. Greenman, supra note 26, at 24.
28. Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 26, at 987.
29. Rick Poynor, Fair Game, PRINT, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 50; see also Negativland, Two
Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 239, 239 (2003).
30. See, e.g., Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 26, at 987-88.
from another.”19  Thus, one could compose a mashup entirely from pre-
existing, unoriginal materials by editing the materials together in an original
way.20  In terms of online video, video mashups follow the “new application
of the original thought” that typifies audio remixing and resampling.21  Indeed,
one author recognized this parallel between remixed audio and video mashups
by referring to video mashups as “remixed video.”22
2. Audio Mashups
Audio mashups, also known as music mashups, comprised the original
genre of mashups.23  In their purest form, audio mashups consist of “two or
more different songs . . . intermixed and played one atop the other.”24  Though
underground disc jockeys, commonly known as D.J.s, have long created
mashups, recent mashups have garnered the most media attention.25  D.J. and
producer Brian Burton, known more commonly as DJ Danger Mouse, released
a mashup of the Beatle’s White Album and rapper Jay-Z’s The Black Album to
produce an album aptly named The Grey Album.26  The Grey Album took lyrics
exclusively from The Black Album and layered them over music entirely from
the White Album, thereby creating an “innovative” sound.27  Another
prominent example combined alternative band Nirvana’s Smells Like Teen
Spirit with music from R&B group Destiny’s Child to produce Smells Like
Booty.28  Also, the band Negativland achieved notoriety for a lawsuit regarding
a Negativland album containing mashed up music from the band U2.29  Audio
mashups such as these continue to gain popularity with the growth of the
Internet and the availability of inexpensive digital editing software.30
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31. Gerber, supra note 5, at 11.
32. Heather Havenstein, IBM Offers Prototype for Building ‘Mashup’ Apps,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 26, 2006, at 18, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=111603.
33. Robert D. Hof, Mix, Match, and Mutate, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, July 25, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/@@76IH*ocQ34AvyQMA/magazine/content/05_30/b39441
08_mz063.htm.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Aidin Vaziri, A DJ’s ‘Mash-up’ of Sound-alike Tunes by the Likes of Green Day Is
Getting Mad Airplay — and No One’s Sued Yet, S.F. CHRON., May 3, 2005, at E1.  The mashup
is available on numerous websites.  See, e.g., Boulevard of Broken Songs, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=j7bTcKzn-zM (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
3. Software-based Mashups
Individuals may also construct mashups entirely based on software.  As
with music mashups, software mashups also combine several sources into a
new product.31  Software companies, such as IBM, define software mashups
as “applications that use open technologies . . . to combine content from more
than one source into a single application.”32  For example, programmer Paul
Rademacher combined information from the classified advertising website
Craigslist.com with Google’s online map search to produce a website where
available rentals “appear as virtual pushpins on maps [in] nearly three-dozen
regions” around Silicon Valley.33  Another site “overlays [Chicago] crime stats
onto Google Maps so you can see what crimes were committed recently in
your neighborhood.”34  Finally, one developer combined “Yahoo! Inc.’s . . .
real-time traffic data with Google Maps” to allow individuals to track highway
congestion.35  These software mashups emulate the genre of video mashups by
combining multiple sources to create something different than the component
parts.
4. Hybrid Mashups
Many mashups defy these categorizations.  Indeed, these hybrid mashups
often combine the elements of a video mashup and a music mashup.  For
example, radio disc jockey Ben Bill combined various video and audio
elements from Green Day’s Boulevard of Broken Dreams, Oasis’s Today,
Travis’s Writing to Reach You, and Eminem’s Sing for the Moment to form the
mashup Boulevard of Broken Songs.36  The resulting mashup music video
fluidly moves from one song and music video to another.
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37. For example, DJ Danger Mouse never received permission from any of the original
copyright holders of either the White Album or The Black Album.  Greenman, supra note 26, at
24.  Many software mashup creators do not seek the permission of website owners whose data
is being used.  Hof, supra note 33.  At least one commentator has noted that mashing up
copyrighted materials without the copyright holder’s permission is “presumptively illegal under
the law as it stands.”  Lessig, supra note 16, at 965.
38. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (search for “mashup”) (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
39. Google, http://www.google.com (search for “video mashup”) (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
40. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 965.
41. Elinor Mills, Mapping a Revolution with ‘Mashups’, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 17, 2005,
http://news.com.com/2009-1025-5944608.html.
42. Lessig, supra note 16, at 965; see also Goo, supra note 3.
43. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 964.
44. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
B. Mashups in the Express(ion) Lane of the Information Superhighway
Many of the copyright issues that exist with video mashups arise with every
type of mashup.37  This comment, however, will focus primarily on video
mashups and mashups that contain at least some video elements.  The reasons
for this are two-fold.  First, video mashups have become extremely popular on
the Internet.  Sites such as YouTube.com host thousands of mashup videos.38
Further, a search at Google for “video mashup” yields approximately one
hundred eight thousand results.39  Accordingly, one commentator noted that
the Internet has seen an “explosion” of video mashups within the past few
years.40  While other types of mashups enjoy popularity, the tremendous
volume and popularity of video mashups warrants further discussion.
Second, video mashups have the ability to carry messages that may be
lacking in other types of mashups.  While certainly requiring creativity to
make, software mashups constitute “tools” rather than a vehicle for
commentary or entertainment.41  Video mashups, however, often serve the
purpose of expressing “critical commentary,” or “artistic” or “political”
messages.42  Video mashups allow people to create a new kind of speech that
they would not otherwise have the ability to express if they could not combine
these pieces of already existing video and audio.43  Nevertheless, the creation
of video mashups remains illegal unless the mashup creator obtains permission
from the copyright holders of the original materials.44  By proscribing video
mashups, the current intellectual property regime may serve to thwart vital
First Amendment values in the entertainment, social, and political contexts.
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45. See Monty Python — Black Knight (Star Wars), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
leEsz9ci5XE (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
46. See Star Lords, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATpv7KEUZQQ (last visited Sept.
28, 2007).
47. Id.
48. Misshapen Features, http://www.misshapenfeatures.com/starlords.php (last visited Sept.
10, 2007).
49. Peanutface, http://www.ifilm.com/video/2745736 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
50. More than ‘Peanuts’ at Stake with MetLife Branding, BANK ADVER. NEWS, Mar. 6,
2000, at 1.
51. Eric Vanatta, But Cf. . . . : The F-Motion, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 285, 287 (2004)
(“Some movies such as Scarface . . . are known for the extensive use of the family of Fuck
words . . . .”).
52. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 16, at 965 (noting that much of the commentary in
mashups is “awful, but some [is] brilliant”); see also Note, “Recoding” and the Derivative
Works Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1488, 1488
(2006) (noting that mixing copyrighted material allows for “new expression in a way that
ascribes a different meaning to [the original work] than intended by [the original work’s]
creator”).
1. Entertainment Expression in Mashups
Largely for entertainment purposes, many video mashups integrate elements
from popular movies and television.  One such mashup combines scenes from
George Lucas’s Star Wars with the “Black Knight” scene from Monty Python
and the Holy Grail.  The scene combines dialogue from both of these movies
over scenes from Holy Grail, while also showing the knights fighting with
lightsabers instead of swords.45  Another mashup, StarLords, mimics a movie
trailer by imagining what it would be like if a director combined the worlds in
Star Wars and Lord of the Rings in the same movie.46  After the various battle
scenes, the mashup climaxes with a rendition of Jimmy Castor’s disco hit, It’s
Just Begun.47  According to StarLords’ creator, “[StarLords] juxtaposes
similar pieces of familiar media structures.  It experiments with sampling what
is normally seen in entirety and in context (the films) and then linking them in
time and space to a popular music track . . . .”48  This type of popular culture
sampling can create mashups that contrast starkly with some of the original
content.  One such mashup, Peanutface,49 combines video of Charles Shultz’s
Peanuts characters, which are viewed as innocent and able to “generate
positive feelings,”50 with dialogue from the movie Scarface, notorious for its
repeated use of vulgar language.51  Though lacking in what some would
consider serious political or social commentary, people value such mashups
for their entertainment value and ability to give new meaning to already
existing materials.52
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53. Mel Gibson’s Signs (of Anti-Semitism), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ae_Kskf
w6c (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
54. Id.
55. Lisa de Moraes, Kanye West’s Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC, WASH. POST, Sept.
3, 2005, at C01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
09/03/AR2005090300165.html.
56. See The Black Lantern, http://www.theblacklantern.com/george.html (last visited Sept.
28, 2007); The Legendary KO, http://www.k-otix.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=43&Itemid=2 (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
57. The Black Lantern, supra note 56.  Such lines include “peoples lives on the line, you
declining to help” and “black folks gotta hope, gotta wait and see if FEMA really comes
through in an emergency.”  Id.
58. Terrie Albano, In the Wake of Katrina — Political Songs Zoom Over the Net, PEOPLE’S
WKLY. WORLD, Sept. 24, 2005, http://www.pww.org/article/view/7787/1/287.
2. Social Expression in Mashups
Alongside their entertainment value, many mashups also contain potent
social commentary dealing with current events.  In these mashups, the creators
piece together materials in a way that critiques a character appearing in the
mashup or some other element of society.  Recently, Mel Gibson’s arrest and
subsequent comments concerning people of the Jewish faith provided fodder
for mashup creators.  Taking clips from the movie Signs, in which Gibson
starred, as well as spoken Yiddish, a movie clip featuring Woody Allen, and
Adam Sandler’s The Hanukkah Song, one mashup creator pieced together Mel
Gibson’s Signs of Anti-Semitism.53  Throughout the mashup, the creator
depicted Gibson as both fearful and excessive in his response to a perceived
threat posed by members of the Jewish faith.54  The title of the mashup and its
content leave little doubt that the creator feels that Gibson harbors anti-Semitic
beliefs.
Following Kanye West’s criticism of President Bush after Hurricane
Katrina,55 creators rushed to forge West’s comments into a mashup.
Combining West’s quote, “George Bush doesn’t care about black people,”
West’s song Gold Digger, the Gold Digger music video, and video of post-
Katrina New Orleans, two groups called The Black Lantern and The
Legendary KO created the mashup George Bush Doesn’t Care About Black
People.56  In this mashup, the creators change West’s Gold Digger lyrics to
reflect the situation in New Orleans.57  One of the mashup’s creators stated that
he felt the “safety and well-being of all people should always be considered
first, and we felt compelled to express that through song.”58  By recasting
West’s work to convey their opinions on President Bush’s handling of
Hurricane Katrina, these mashup artists transformed existing materials to relay
their own beliefs.
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59. See About.com, Bush and Blair Sing Endless Love, http://politicalhumor.about.com/cs/
bushmultimedia/v/blendlesslove.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
60. R. Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies, J. INTERNET L., Dec.
2005, at 15.
61. Dan Mitchell, Tail Is Wagging the Internet Dog, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at C5.  A
partial transcript and the audio of Stevens’s speech can found online as well.  Wired Blogs: 27B
Stroke 6 (June 30, 2006), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2006/06/your_own_person.html?
entry_id=1512499.  
62. J. Scott Orr, Technically Speaking, These Guys Are Morons, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), Aug. 20, 2006, at 7.
63. Lessig, supra note 16, at 965.
64. See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 26, at 988; Lessig, supra note 16, at 965; see also
infra Part II.A, B.2.
65. See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 26, at 988 n.152.
66. See Greenman, supra note 26, at 24 (noting that none of the samples used on The Grey
3. Political Expression in Mashups
Finally, video mashups may also contain strong political messages.  A
mashup that first appeared on the Internet several years ago showed numerous
clips of President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in a way that
made them appear to sing the Lionel Ritchie/Diana Ross duet Endless Love to
each other.59  One observer viewed this mashup as “commentary on Anglo-
American cooperation in launching and prosecuting the war in Iraq”60 and the
close relationship that developed between Bush and Blair in the process.
Another mashup contained audio clips from Sen. Ted Stevens’s infamous
“series of tubes” speech regarding regulation of the Internet.61  This mashup
combined the audio of the speech with video appearing to originate from the
1950’s showing vacuum tubes and antiquated computer equipment, as if to
suggest Stevens’s views of the Internet are equally antiquated and that he
displays what others have described as a “startling technological ignorance.”62
Similar examples of how such political commentary can be woven into
mashups abound.  As with other mashups, the mashup creator takes existing
materials and recombines them in a way to create a new message that differs
from the content present in the source materials.  As a vehicle for conveying
this type of commentary, the potential of such mashups “is just beginning to
be glimpsed.”63
While mashups provide creators a new way to combine images from our
culture to produce new messages, mashup creation, in many instances, violates
the copyrights of the authors of the original materials.64  This occurs because
most mashups contain at least some previously copyrighted work, and because
the mashup creators seldom seek or receive permission from the copyright
holders.65  While these barriers have not stopped some individuals from
creating mashups,66 such illegalities increase the costs associated with
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Album were legally cleared); Lessig, supra note 16, at 965 (noting that the creator of the
Bush/Blair Endless Love clip sought permission to use the song, but permission was denied).
67. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 966, 969.
68. Id. at 965-66.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“As the
text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining
the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to
give the public appropriate access to their work . . . .”).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
72. Id. § 106(1).
73. Id. § 106(3).
74. Id. § 106(2).
producing mashups.67  These costs, including both the financial costs of
purchasing rights and the opportunity costs of investing time and effort to
secure permission for a non-profit mashup, restrict the potential of mashups
as a tool for commentary by deterring many individuals from creating
mashups.68  Because this comment argues for a change in copyright law that
would enhance First Amendment values by expanding the marketplace of
ideas, an understanding of current copyright law in the United States is
necessary.
III. Copyright Law
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”69  This provision grants Congress the
authority to define the contours of copyright law.70  In accordance with this
authority, Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, which granted authors
“exclusive rights” over works they create.71  These exclusive rights include the
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work,”72 “to distribute copies . . . of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale,”73 and “to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work.”74  This expansive right to create derivative
works figures prominently into the current debate concerning mashups,
especially regarding the debate over how fair use might be used to temper an
author’s derivative works right.
A. The Expansive Derivative Works Right
The 1976 Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
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75. Id. § 101.
76. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the “famous movie” Gone with the Wind was a derivative work based on the book
Gone with the Wind); see also Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right
and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 326 (2005). 
77. See, e.g., Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1274 (holding that the book Scarlett: The Sequel was
a derivative work based on the book Gone with the Wind).
78. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that comic book characters are protectable under copyright law).
79. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that plastic toys based on drawings of Disney characters are derivative works). 
80. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the sculpture
based on a picture of some puppies was a derivative work).
81. See, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182,
185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding defendants’ sampling of copyrighted work to display a “callous
disregard” for the rights of the copyright holder).
82. Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1218
(1997).
83. Id. at 1220.
84. Id.
85. See Abramowicz, supra note 76, at 334 (“[T]he tests for violation of the derivative right
and violation of the reproduction right are themselves almost redundant.”).  This comment
assumes that works that involve some transformation should be classified as derivative works,
even if they could also arguably be classified as reproductions.  This comment also assumes that
reproduction rights will be narrowly classified to full reproduction or only “trivial” changes in
the copyrighted work.
86. Erin E. Gallagher, On the Fair Use Fence Between Derivative Works and Allegedly
Infringing Creations: A Proposal for a Middle Ground, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 763-68
(2005) (noting courts have found the creation of a derivative work in borrowing “fringe
elements” from a previous copyrighted work).
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”75  Courts have interpreted the
definition expansively.  In addition to encompassing things like movie
versions of a book76 or a sequel to a novel,77 courts have extended derivative
rights to cover unique characters in cartoons or novels,78 three-dimensional
figures based on two-dimensional art,79 sculptures inspired by a picture,80 and
digital samples used by rap artists from old pop songs.81  This broad definition
has led one commentator to observe that “any work that incorporates a portion
of a copyrighted work in some form presumably falls within the statutory
definition of a ‘derivative work.’”82  In addition, “[c]ourts have given little
guidance as to the quantum of similarity . . . necessary to become liable for
copyright infringement.”83  As a result, taking even “a very small amount of
expression from a copyrighted work” may result in copyright infringement for
violating the derivative works right.84  Therefore, the derivative works right
encompasses not only full reproduction of a copyrighted work,85 but also
materials that appropriate even minor elements from copyrighted works.86
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87. See Abramowicz, supra note 76, at 327 (“[T]he derivative right could lead someone
who otherwise would not have created a copyrighted work to create one.”); Paul Goldstein,
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 209, 216
(1983) (noting that derivative rights “enable[] prospective copyright owners to proportion their
[creative] investment in a work’s expression to the returns expected not only from the market
in which the copyrighted work is first published, but from other, derivative markets as well”);
cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 n.18 (2003) (“[T]he economic philosophy behind the
Copyright Clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.” (citing
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting an unauthorized derivative work could hurt the potential
market of the original work).
88. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (citing
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
89. Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 IND. L.J. 851, 884
(2006) (noting that where derivative rights have been violated “the injury to the copyright owner
is debatable”).
90. Abramowicz, supra note 76, at 330 (“It thus seems unlikely that the derivative right
encourages the creation of more works than it discourages.”); Voegtli, supra note 82, at 1243
(“[D]erivative rights may actually reduce the production of expressive works because they
inhibit creation of appropriative works by raising their production cost.”).
91. Voegtli, supra note 82, at 1237.  Prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, both
statutory and judge-made derivative rights were slow to develop.  See id. at 1233-37.  The 1976
Copyright Act brought derivative works to their broadest, most expansive point to date.  Id. at
1237.
92. For example, despite no entitlement to a derivative right covering translations, Harriet
Beecher Stowe still wrote Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  In a dispute involving whether a German
translation violated Stowe’s copyright, the court found Stowe had no right to prohibit
Courts interpret derivative works rights broadly because these rights, in theory,
serve to increase the amount of works available to the public by promising
authors the opportunity for greater financial rewards.87  Proof of the existence
of such incentives, however, is lacking, even though derivative works rights
remain in effect and make the creation of most mashups illegal.
1. Derivative Works Rights May Not Promote Creation
Though courts assume that derivative rights give authors the incentive to
create more works,88 one commentator has questioned whether derivative
works rights actually provide any meaningful incentive.89  Other commentators
have gone so far as to suggest that the derivative works right may actually
decrease the total amount of expression available in the marketplace.90  Such
an assertion seems plausible, given that the current derivative works
entitlement was not present in copyright law prior to the 1976 Copyright Act.91
Despite the lack of robust derivative works protection prior to that time,
substantial evidence exists that authors still felt the incentives to create.92  In
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unauthorized translations, even going so far as to note that “translation enhances the value of
the original.”  See generally Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
13,514).
93. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 496 fig.1
(2004).
94. Id.
95. Id.  The number of copyrights filed is arrived at by analyzing the data in the graph.  The
data estimates break down as follows:  1910-19, approximately 1 million registrations; 1920-29,
approximately 1.5 million registrations; 1930-39, approximately 1.5 million registrations; 1940-
49, approximately 2 million registrations; 1950-59, approximately 2 million registrations; 1960-
69, approximately 2.5 million registrations; 1970-75, approximately 1.5 million registrations.
Id.
96. Abramowicz, supra note 76, at 330.
97. Voegtli, supra note 82, at 1237.
98. See N’gai Croal, Technology: Time for Your Mashup?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 2006, at
61 (noting that “[v]ideo mashups also tend to be unauthorized”).
99. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1, 50 (2002) (“Under present law, the copyright owner’s ‘reproduction right’ . . . is viewed
as already encompassing much of what would otherwise be covered by the ‘derivative works
right.’”).
100. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2000) (granting authors derivative and reproduction rights,
and stating a derivative right involves transformation); Rubenfeld, supra note 99, at 51 (noting
“the reproduction right is supposed to be violated only when an infringer reproduces ‘the
copyrighted work,’” not just elements from the work).
fact, during 1975, the year immediately preceding the enactment of the
statutory derivative right, authors filed over 300,000 copyright registrations.93
Further, authors filed a minimum of 100,000 copyright registrations in nearly
every year between 1910 and 1975.94  In all, authors filed over twelve million
copyright registrations in the sixty-five years preceding the enactment of
statutory derivative rights.95  Yet, despite this evidence and the lack of any
empirical study proving that derivative rights actually serve as an incentive for
creation,96 the 1976 Copyright Act and the courts continue to define derivative
rights broadly.97  
2. Mashups Likely Violate Derivative Works Rights
Under the Copyright Act’s sweeping definition of derivative works, the
creation of most mashups constitutes a violation of copyright law.  This occurs
because most mashups are created either partially or entirely from copyrighted
works.98  While mashups may be viewed as violating reproduction rights,99
mashups do not constitute a pure “reproduction,” because fundamentally,
mashups in some way transform the original works.  This makes mashups
more of a derivative work than a reproduction.100  It does not matter if the
mashup artist targets a different market than the original author, or if the
mashup contains an entirely different message than the original material.  If the
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101. Voegtli, supra note 82, at 1227, 1231 (noting neither market effect nor the
transformative nature of the new work can save it from being deemed a derivative work).
102. Id. at 1237.
103. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
105. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting
HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
106. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
107. Id. at 575 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
108. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
109. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).  
110. Cf. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548-49 (noting that although fair use allows for
materials to be used without an author’s permission, copying between three hundred and four
hundred words was not a fair use).
mashup artist uses copyrighted material, then the mashup artist has probably
violated the original author’s derivative rights.101  Given the wide scope of
protection that derivative rights offer copyright holders, a mashup creator is
often left with only one defense for the appropriation of copyrighted material
in their creations: fair use.102
B. The Fair Use Defense Is No Defense for Mashup Creators
To avoid the rigid application of copyright law and the potential stifling of
“the very creativity which [copyright] law is designed to foster,”103 the 1976
Copyright Act incorporated a “fair use” limitation on an author’s powers under
copyright.104  The United States Supreme Court defined fair use as “a privilege
in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent.”105  Although first codified in the 1976
Copyright Act, fair use existed as a “judge-made doctrine until the passage of
the 1976 Copyright Act.”106  The reason for the doctrine’s creation was that
fair use was “thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”107  As Justice Story
recognized in 1845, “[T]here are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.  Every book in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow . . . .”108
Thus, fair use recognizes that there is little in the arts or literature that does
not rely on previous works for its creation.  In order to promote creativity, the
law must insure not only that authors do not have “absolute rule” over their
works,109 but that subsequent authors and creators can borrow from these
works to at least a limited degree.110  The 1976 Copyright Act simultaneously
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111. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
112. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
113. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that in determining if any use of copyrighted material is fair,
“the factors to be considered shall include” (emphasis added)).
115. Id. § 107(1).
116. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
117. Id.
118. Id. 
119. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
120. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. (finding original works by music artist Roy Orbison fall within the “core” of
codified fair use to insure this goal and set forth the elements that constitute
fair use.
1. Statutory Factors of Copyright
The 1976 Copyright Act (the Act) gives several examples of activities that
could be considered fair use, including “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, . . . scholarship, or research,” while also expressly noting that such
activities are “not an infringement of copyright.”111  The Court has noted that
such examples provide only “general guidance,”112 and that Congress had “not
intended [the list] to be exhaustive.”113  To determine fair use, the Act lists four
factors that courts must consider.114  First, courts must assess “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes.”115  This factor acts to ascertain if the
new work merely supersedes the original creation, “or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression meaning or message.”116  Put another way, this factor asks to what
degree “the new work is ‘transformative.’”117  Since the goal of copyright is
to promote new creations, “the more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors . . . that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.”118
Second, courts must examine “the nature of the copyrighted work.”119  The
nature of the work describes how original the work’s expression is.120
Primarily, “[t]his factor calls for recognition that some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others.”121  A potential infringer
cannot claim fair use as easily when the source work approaches this core.122
A work must contain “original [] creative expression,”123 not just a simple
recitation of factual information, to be close to copyright’s core purpose.124
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copyright); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)
(noting the “need to disseminate factual works” is greater, making it less likely copyright’s core
protections apply).
125. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
126. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (finding that “parodies almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works” but can still be a fair use).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
128. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
129. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984)
(finding the copying of entire television programs onto a video tape does not necessarily weigh
against fair use if done for private purposes).
130. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66 (finding that the copying of several hundred
words from Gerald Ford’s novel copied “the most powerful” parts of the novel and thus such
copying was not a fair use).
131. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
132. See id. at 587 (“The Court of Appeals is of course correct that this factor calls for
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but also about their quality and
importance, too.”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66 (examining the amount of material taken
in both its “absolute terms” and its “qualitative nature”).
133. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587-88.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
This prohibition exists because factual information is often “so integral to the
idea expressed as to be inseparable from it,” and thus, does not contain enough
originality to overcome a fair use defense.125  One may only claim fair use
regarding “original” works when the copying is necessary to convey a
message.126
Third, courts must weigh “the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”127  This factor also reconsiders
the “purpose and character” of the use of the appropriated copyrighted
materials.128  Thus, depending on the copying’s purpose, copying an entire
copyrighted work may not weigh against a finding of fair use,129 whereas the
copying of only a few hundred words from a novel may.130  Principally, the
third factor examines the justification for the amount of material copied.131  To
consider this factor, courts weigh both the amount of expression copied as well
as the significance of the materials taken from the original copyrighted
work.132  Because incorporating a large amount of copyrighted work “may
reveal a dearth of transformative character or purpose under the first factor,”
courts are likely to find “a work composed primarily of an original,
particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely
superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original” and not protected by fair
use.133
Fourth, courts must consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.”134  This factor “is undoubtedly the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/3
2007] COMMENTS 333
135. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
136. Id. at 568.
137. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
138. See Harper & Row, 417 U.S. at 567-69 (finding that because the material was copied
from an unpublished novel, the market was more likely to be adversely affected and fair use was
less likely to be found).
139. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (noting things like criticism and parody, though likely
harmful to a work, might not weigh against fair use).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
141. Id. § 106.
142. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (“The factors enumerated in the section [explaining
fair use] are not meant to be exclusive . . . .”); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2001) (explaining the
1976 Copyright Act requires courts to examine the “four statutory factors plus any other factor
the court deems appropriate” in determining fair use).
143. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (noting the four statutory factors may not “be treated in
isolation, one from another,” and that the factors must “be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright”).
144. Id. at 594.
145. Id. at 580-81.
single most important element of fair use.”135  The effects and value test
examines the harm on the actual and potential markets for not only the original
work, but derivative works as well.136  Moreover, this test considers the effects
that would occur on the potential market if the potentially infringing conduct
should become widespread.137  Generally, the more harm that comes to the
market for a copyrighted work, the less likely it is that a court will find fair
use.138  Even so, the Court found that fair use might exist in limited instances
even when copying a work “kills demand for the original.”139
Theoretically, fair use presents a strong defense to copyright infringement.
The section of the Act containing fair use specifically mandates that it applies
“notwithstanding” any of the rights granted under section 106 of the Act.140
Section 106 also states that the rights granted are “[s]ubject to” fair use rights
granted in the Act.141  Additionally, the four factors listed in the Act are not
exclusive, for the courts may consider other relevant factors if they find them
important.142  Furthermore, courts do not consider the four factors in isolation,
but rather, consider them together, and courts can weight each factor as they
deem appropriate.143  This framework gives courts considerable discretion to
assign the factors different weights when appropriate, and to find an otherwise
infringing work to constitute a fair use.  The Supreme Court has done so, most
notably by finding a potentially infringing work to be protected as a parody.144
In defining this fair use, however, the Court stopped short of imbuing works
like mashups with the same protections that parodies receive.145  To understand
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146. 510 U.S. 569.
147. Id. at 574.
148. Id. at 578-79; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
149. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
why the Court did not extend fair use protection to works like mashups, the
following subparts examine the Court’s differentiation between parody and
satire.
2. Fair Use and Parodies
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether the rap group 2 Live Crew’s commercial use of portions of Roy
Orbison’s song, Oh, Pretty Woman, constituted fair use.146  2 Live Crew
conceded that their use of Orbison’s material infringed Orbison’s copyright
“but for a finding of fair use through parody.”147  Per section 107 of the Act,
the Court first examined the “purpose and character” of the alleged infringing
use to determine if parody was a transformative use.148  The Court had noted
that the reason for determining the purpose and the character of the infringing
work was to determine if the work “adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message.”149  The Court also stated that such transformative works “lie at
the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright.”150  The more transformative a work is, the Court
reasoned, “the less will be the significance of other factors” that could weigh
against finding fair use.151  The Court held that parody was transformative,
stating:
Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value . . . .  Like less ostensibly humorous forms of
criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.  We thus line
up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment
or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107 [of the Copyright
Act].152
Because the Court held parodied work to be transformative, 2 Live Crew’s
song could constitute a fair use.  Transformative works possess this ability
because they do more than merely “supersede” the original creation.  Rather,
transformative works serve to further copyright’s goal of promoting science
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153. Id.
154. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2000) (defining a derivative work as “any other form in
which a work may be . . . transformed”).
155. 510 U.S. 569.
156. Id. at 580.
157. Id. at 581 n.15 (citing 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 500 (2d ed. 1989)).
158. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
159. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
160. Id. at 580-81
161. Id.
162. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
163. Id. at 580-81.
and the useful arts.153  This analysis seems to not only create a broad fair use
right, but also usurp part of the derivative works right by making
transformation an exception to the derivative works right.154  Although this
analysis suggests sweeping protections for transformative works, the Court
limited this protection to parody.  Consequently, a satirist could not use
transformation to overcome the derivative works right.
3. Unfair Use and Satire
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court outlined a distinction
between parody and satire, offering only the former significant protection as
a fair use.155  The Court defined parody as a work that, “at least in part,
comments on [the original] author’s work.”156  A satire, on the other hand, is
“a work ‘in which prevalent follies or vices are assailed with ridicule.’”157  Put
another way, parody targets the copyrighted work, while a satire uses the
copyrighted work to take aim at some other target.158  The Court largely
excluded satire from receiving the same fair use protections that parody
received as a transformative work.  The Court held that if “the commentary has
no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition” and
is used merely to get attention, then “the claim to fairness in borrowing from
another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish).”159  The Court
distinguished parody and satire because “[p]arody needs to mimic an original
to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . .
imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires
justification for the very act of borrowing.”160
As a result of this decision, parodies that in some way criticize the original
work gain more of a protected status, as the Court determined parodies to be
intrinsically transformative.161  This means that a parody creator need not
prove as strong of a showing for the other factors of fair use.162  Satires, on the
other hand, are viewed with judicial suspicion and require “justification” for
the borrowing.163  This result has caused courts to find a lack of fair use when
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
336 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:317
164. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
165. Id. at 1401.
166. Id. (emphasis omitted).
167. Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
168. Id.; see also Gallagher, supra note 86, at 767 (noting the plaintiff in Dr. Seuss
Enterprises “sought an injunction precisely because the irreverent, satirical critique of the
Simpson trial and events surrounding it did not match the innocent, whimsical style of the Dr.
Seuss collection”).
169. Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1401 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
170. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1585-86 (2004).
171. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
172. Id. at 579.
173. Jason M. Vogel, Note, The Cat in the Hat’s Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit’s
Narrowing of the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 312-13 (1998).  Even the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged in Campbell that it is difficult for judges to determine what constitutes
parody.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
a creator used satire in an arguably transformative work, simply because the
satire did not criticize the original work.  In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit had to determine if a book
lampooning the O.J. Simpson murder trial using elements from The Cat in the
Hat constituted fair use.164  The book in question, The Cat NOT in the Hat!,
“broadly mimic[ed] Dr. Seuss’ characteristic style.”165  The court, however,
held that The Cat NOT in the Hat! simply retold Simpson’s saga, and “[did]
not hold [Seuss’] style up to ridicule”166 or have “‘critical bearing on the
substance or style of’ The Cat in the Hat.”167  Although the author of The Cat
NOT in the Hat! placed Simpson in a world distinct from those Seuss created,
and used the story to tell a tale of murder and a subsequent criminal trial,168 the
Ninth Circuit still concluded that “[b]ecause there is no effort to create a
transformative work with ‘new expression, meaning, or message,’ the
infringing work’s commercial use further cuts against the fair use defense.”169
4. Effects of the Parody-Satire Distinction
The Dr. Seuss decision “draw[s] a definitive line between protected parody
and unprotected satire,” by judging satire to contain “no relevant
transformation.”170  The Ninth Circuit presumed satire to be non-
transformative because it viewed satire as a lazy creator’s way to “avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh,”171 rather than something that adds
“new expression, meaning, or message.”172  Many criticize the fact that courts
view satire in this manner, given the difficulty in determining what constitutes
a parody or satire.173  In fact, one court seems to have confused the parody-
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174. Williams v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (C.D. Cal. 1999).  The
court seems to use the term “parody” to describe both satire and parody.  “A parody does not
gain the protection of the Fair Use Doctrine if it merely uses the protected work as a means to
ridicule another object.”  Id.  Since parody, by its nature, does not ridicule “another object,” but
only the “protected work,” the judge should have referred to the work in question as being
satire, not parody.
175. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that making caricatures of O.J. Simpson look similar to The Cat in the Hat to be satire).
176. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding a book
appropriating characters from Gone with the Wind to be parody).
177. Vogel, supra note 173, at 312.
178. GEORGE A. TEST, SATIRE: SPIRIT AND ART 160 (1991) (“The satirist uses the prior
knowledge of the audience and the presumed ability of those in the audience to detect the
incongruity, contraction, or incompatibility between what they know of the original style or
form and what they perceive before them.”).
179. See discussion infra Part III.B.5; see also supra Part II.B.
180. 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
181. Id.  Specifically, the court found that Arriba’s purpose in use of the images was to
“improv[e] access to information on the internet” while Kelly’s purpose was for “artistic
expression.”  Id. at 819.
182. Id. at 819.
satire terminology.174  Similarly, characters and styles appropriated from
original works have been found to be satire in one instance,175 and protected
parody in another.176  Some observers have noted that this seemingly arbitrary
distinction allows judges to find parody when it suits the results they wish to
achieve.177  Commentators have also stated that satires must be transformative
in order for audience members to appreciate the incongruities that give satire
its message.178  Given such a gray area between the two, distinguishing satire
as non-transformative seems to ignore the fact that satires, like parodies,
necessarily alter the meaning of the original work.  By adding this new
expression to an already existing work, satires transform the original work into
something new.179
What further confuses the parody-satire distinction is that while courts
consider satire non-transformative, works that constitute neither parody nor
satire have been found transformative.  In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth
Circuit held that “thumbnail” images used by an Internet search engine were
full copies of the original works.180  The court, however, also held that even
though the images were copies, they were sufficiently transformative to be
considered a fair use, because Arriba used the fully reproduced images as a
“tool” rather than for “aesthetic” purposes as Kelly had originally done.181
Although Arriba fully copied the images and did not add new expression,
meaning, or message to them, because Arriba “created a different purpose for
the images, Arriba’s use [was] transformative.”182
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183. See supra Part II.B.. 
184. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
185. Id. at 582.
186. See Madison, supra note 170, at 1618 (noting in many instances, social criticism could
be accepted as either parody or satire).
187. See supra Part II.A.4.
188. In Campbell, the Court believed 2 Live Crew’s song was probably parody in part
because 2 Live Crew’s song made fun of how “bland and banal” Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty
Woman seemed to members of 2 Live Crew.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
Dr. Seuss and Kelly dictate that a parodic work is likely transformative, and
a work that is neither parody nor satire can be transformative, but a work that
is satirical in nature is presumptively non-transformative.  This incongruous
result would prevent most mashups from being recognized as a transformative
fair use.
5. Effects of the Parody-Satire Distinction on Mashups
Courts will likely classify mashups as satire because mashups often target
their criticism at politics or society.183  By aiming at these external elements
and not at the works they are composed of, the “claim to fairness in borrowing
from another’s work”184 needed to create mashups essentially vanishes, leaving
mashups outside of the protection of fair use and as an infringement on the
original author’s derivative works right.
Arguably, the Court established a low standard for finding parody when it
held that  “[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody
is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”185  The “porous”
nature of the distinction between parody and satire can potentially allow a
mashup creator to assert that a mashup comprises fair use as a parody.186  For
example, one could argue the Boulevard of Broken Songs mashup is parody.187
One could “reasonably” perceive the mashup as criticism of the music and
videos in the source songs as generic and interchangeable with each other.
This interchangeability explains why the songs mash together so well.  The
mashup of George Bush and Tony Blair singing Endless Love to each other
could be seen as critiquing how “bland and banal”188 the song is, as its lyrics
can be used as easily to describe the feelings between political figures as
between lovers.  And one could argue Mel Gibson’s Signs of Anti-Semitism
critiques Gibson’s role in Signs by exposing the flaws in casting him in the
role of a hero and problem solver when he harbors feelings towards people of
the Jewish faith that make him appear weak and illogical.
At the same time, the flexibility in the parody-satire distinction would also
allow each of these mashups to be classified as satire.  One could argue
Boulevard of Broken Songs critiques the recording industry for signing bands
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that sound too similar or lambastes the public for making the music popular.
Similarly, one might see the Bush/Blair mashup as satirical commentary on
foreign affairs rather than as criticism of the song itself.  Finally, one could
view the Gibson mashup as a satire about the events surrounding Gibson’s
arrest, rather than as commentary about his movies.  Regardless of whether
parody or satire is chosen, all of these mashups are transformative because
they give the original works “new expression, meaning, or message.”189
Under current copyright law, however, courts will only recognize this
transformation in the case of parody.  Nonetheless, this “recoding” of the
meaning in the original materials has First Amendment value because it
contributes to the marketplace of ideas.190  Even so, fair use can only
consistently protect that value if parody is found.  Principally, the First
Amendment values of this transformation have been rejected by the courts.
These findings have occurred because courts hold copyright immune from a
higher level of scrutiny when copyright conflicts with the First Amendment.
Furthermore, in cases where the values underlying copyright and the First
Amendment intersect, courts have held copyright need only have a rational
basis for suppressing First Amendment values.191
IV. First Amendment and Copyright: A Constitutional Mashup
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”192  Despite this
command, several observers have noted that through copyright law, Congress
and the courts have done exactly that.193  One observer noted that “[c]opyright
has always posed a potential conflict with the First Amendment: A successful
copyright infringement action gives the plaintiff the right to stop the defendant
from printing, performing, or otherwise disseminating certain works.
Infringing works can be seized and destroyed — book burning mandated by
law.”194  Although “arguably the country’s most sweeping and important
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regulation of speech,”195 courts often explicitly decline to subject copyright to
the First Amendment.196  Indeed, one court went so far as to declare
“copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.”197  Under what one scholar has termed a “magic free speech
immunity,” most courts have rejected the existence of any conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment.198  This immunity stems from a duo of
Supreme Court cases finding copyright to be largely free from First
Amendment review.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Copyright and the First Amendment
1. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the U.S. Supreme
Court had the opportunity to widen the scope of fair use “when the information
conveyed relates to matters of high public concern.”199  The defendants
asserted that the Court needed to widen the scope of fair use in order to protect
“First Amendment values.”200  The Court rejected this claim by holding that
“copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act.”201  The Court reasoned that
copyright only protects the expression of ideas, rather than the facts or ideas
themselves.202  This leaves people free to communicate facts or ideas, just not
in the manner that the original author expressed them.203  The Court concluded
that the defendant’s proposed expansion of fair use would “effectively destroy
any expectation of copyright protection” because an infringer could merely
“dub[] the infringement a fair use.”204  Without such protections, the
“economic incentive” of copyright would be destroyed,205 leaving the public
without access to the work to begin with.206  Because of the idea/expression
dichotomy, the Court found that “First Amendment protections [were] already
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/3
2007] COMMENTS 341
207. Id. at 560.
208. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
209. Id. at 218 n.23.
210. Id. at 218.
211. Id. at 218-19.
212. Id. at 219.
213. Id.; see also supra Part IV.A.
214. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340, 349-50 (1991)).
215. Id. at 219.
216. Id. (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 221.
embodied in the Copyright [Act]” and thus refused to subject copyright to First
Amendment scrutiny.207
2.  Eldred v. Ashcroft
The U.S. Supreme Court again considered the possibility of conflict
between copyright and the First Amendment in Eldred v. Ashcroft.208  In
Eldred, the petitioners challenged the retroactive application of the Copyright
Term Extension Act to works that were about to enter the public domain.209
The petitioner contended that this retroactive application affected his First
Amendment rights and thereby warranted higher judicial scrutiny.210  The
Court squarely “reject[ed] petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly
strict scrutiny” for copyright.211  Citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, the Court noted that “copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations.”212  The Court then offered several reasons why
copyright need not be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.  First, as in Harper
& Row, the Court again discussed the idea/expression dichotomy as a First
Amendment safeguard.213  Because copyright could only protect expression,
not ideas, the Court reasoned that “every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted
work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication.”214
Second, the Court examined fair use as a First Amendment safeguard.  The
Court explained that fair use insured an adequate balance between copyright
and the First Amendment because fair use “allows the public to use not only
facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in
certain circumstances.”215  Fair use, according to the Court, “affords
considerable latitude for scholarship and comment, and even for parody.”216
Even with these two safeguards, the Court held that copyright does not possess
categorical immunity from the First Amendment.217  Nonetheless, the Court
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held that it would not apply a strict First Amendment scrutiny unless Congress
drastically alters the contours of copyright.218
Finally, the Court explained that copyright was added to the Constitution
“close in time” to the First Amendment.219  The Court reasoned that the
temporal proximity of the two clauses “indicates that, in the Framers’ view,
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.”220
According to the Court, this compatibility is evident because guaranteeing a
“marketable right to the use of one’s expression” creates the “economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”221  Despite this attempt to reconcile
copyright and the First Amendment, Eldred and Harper & Row do not
adequately address First Amendment concerns.
3. Problems with the Harper & Row and Eldred Decisions
The Court’s analysis in Harper & Row and Eldred failed to adequately
explain copyright’s immunity from a more rigorous examination under the
First Amendment.  First, the Court misplaced its reliance on the
idea/expression dichotomy as an adequate safeguard of the First Amendment.
Indeed, the Court has previously ruled that, in the free speech context, the
government may not censor expression while claiming it still allows
expression of the idea in alternate forms.222  The Court has held that speakers
often find a particular method of expression necessary to communicate a
particular idea.223  The idea/expression dichotomy, however, fundamentally
conflicts with this principle.224  The Court cannot logically conclude that the
marriage of idea and expression are necessary to promote free speech, while
at the same time concluding their separation somehow promotes the First
Amendment in the context of copyright.
Second, current fair use standards serve to harm the expressive interests
embodied by the First Amendment rather than advance them.225  This occurs
because fair use represents an inherently “nebulous” concept.226  Additionally,
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courts have balanced the factors used to determine fair use in ways that appear
inconsistent.227  Further, the statutory factors used to determine fair use are not
exclusive, and courts can consider any other issue deemed relevant.228  The
flexibility of fair use, which the Eldred Court said provided “considerable
latitude” for speech activities,229 creates doctrinal uncertainty.230  Given the
tremendous liability one faces for violating copyright,231 any uncertainty
infuses large risks into acts of creation where the creator hopes fair use will
protect the transformation of another’s work.232  This risk prompts the “kind
of self-censorship [that] is traditionally a matter of concern to the First
Amendment.”233
Third, the Eldred Court’s assertions of compatibility between copyright and
the First Amendment are conclusory and ignore the advances made in both
copyright law and First Amendment jurisprudence since the adoption of the
Constitution.  The Court noted that because the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment “were adopted close in time,” copyright is compatible with the
First Amendment.234  The Court also noted  “copyright’s purpose is to promote
the creation and publication of free expression.”235  These statements offer
little insight into why courts have heretofore thought copyright and the First
Amendment compatible.  The fact that both copyright and the First
Amendment were contemporaneously incorporated into the Constitution does
little to explain their relation to each other.236  Just because copyright appears
in the Constitution does not mean it is exempt from the First Amendment.237
The Interstate Commerce Clause was also adopted “close in time” to the First
Amendment, but a federal law prohibiting transportation of political literature
across state lines would not likely survive First Amendment scrutiny.238
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Finally, copyright has dramatically changed both in terms of scope and
duration since the adoption of the Constitution.239  One scholar has posited that
the Founders might no longer find copyright and the First Amendment
compatible given these changes.240  Even the Eldred Court held that copyright
might be subject to First Amendment scrutiny if Congress altered the
“traditional contours” of copyright.241  The Eldred Court, however, simply
reaffirmed Harper & Row’s holding that “copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas” without giving due consideration to
the substantial enlargement both the scope and duration of copyright have
undergone.242
The Court’s refusal to acknowledge the First Amendment conflict in Harper
& Row and Eldred has prevented other courts from taking a meaningful look
at the intersection between copyright and the First Amendment.243
Consequently, courts have not examined copyright’s implications on
expressive transformative works, such as mashups, through the lens of the
First Amendment.  Conducting such an examination, however, reveals that
copyright does indeed pose serious First Amendment conflicts.
B. Reasons Copyright Conflicts with the First Amendment
Scholars have suggested varying reasons for why courts should subject
copyright to heightened judicial scrutiny when resolving First Amendment
conflicts.  These scholars believe copyright is viewpoint discriminatory, a
content-based speech regulation, a content-neutral speech regulation, and an
unlawful prior restraint.  In the context of mashups and other transformative
works, however, uncertainty exists concerning whether these traditional First
Amendment doctrines, if applied to copyright, would provide mashups with
any meaningful protection.
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253. Volokh, supra note 193, at 703-06.
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1. Copyright Is a Viewpoint Discriminatory Speech Regulation
Copyright law favors works that are “critical” of previously copyrighted
works when determining if an infringing work constitutes a fair use.244
Generally, courts look to see if the alleged infringing activity has “critical
bearing” on the original work.245  Absent a finding of this element, a court will
likely determine that no fair use exists.246  As one scholar has observed, “if you
and I borrow exactly the same amount of material from a copyrighted work,
I may escape liability because my speech criticized the copyrighted work,
while you may be forced to pay damages because yours did not.”247
In traditional free speech law, a speech restriction based on viewpoint “is
considered virtually unconstitutional per se.”248  If Congress passed a law
making speeches about the president illegal unless the speeches criticized the
president, a court would almost certainly strike the law down as viewpoint
discriminatory.249  Nevertheless, in copyright cases, courts not only examine
the critical nature of potentially infringing speech, but also regularly enjoin
non-critical speech.250  As a result of this focus, judicial decisions seem “to
serve a single overriding value of protecting criticism rather than . . . different
kinds of speech.”251  Favoring criticism over other viewpoints, such as praise
or emulation, renders copyright a viewpoint discriminatory speech
regulation.252
2. Copyright Is a Content-Based Speech Regulation
Copyright defines prohibited expression based on the expression’s content.
Therefore, courts should consider copyright a content-based regulation for two
reasons.  First, copyright aims to curb speech based on the subject matter of
the expression.253  Unlike content-neutral regulations that regulate speech for
reasons unrelated to content, such as time, place, and manner restrictions,254
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content-based regulations target speech for the sake of the speech’s content.255
While copyright law allows a creator broad freedom to create almost anything,
that freedom ends where the content of the creation resembles pre-existing
content.256
Second, the fair use exception to copyright law makes copyright a content-
based regulation.  Even when a law does not seek to control content, “[t]he
Court has repeatedly held that a law’s content-based exceptions make the law
itself content-based.”257  Thus, in Regan v. Time, Inc., the Court found a
restriction on photographic currency reproduction content-based because the
restriction contained several exceptions to the ban, such as allowing
reproductions for newsworthy purposes.258  Copyright law contains a similar
exception in the statutory factor of fair use that examines the use’s “purpose
and character.”259  Applying the holding of Regan to copyright’s “different
treatment for news, parody, and commentary . . . likewise makes copyright law
content-based.”260
3. Copyright Is a Content-Neutral Speech Regulation
Other observers have argued that courts should not consider copyright a
content-based regulation, but instead should treat copyright as a content-
neutral speech regulation.261  One scholar asserted that copyright does not fit
well within the rubric of content-based regulations because the government
does not take a position on the subject matter or message conveyed in
instances of copyright infringement.262  Rather, copyright examines the
similarities between the alleged infringing content and the content of a
copyrighted work.263  Copyright’s “content-sensitiv[ity]” does not “mean that
it is ‘content-based’ within the meaning of the First Amendment.”264
Accordingly, courts should view copyright as falling in a subcategory of
content-neutral regulations dealing with speech entitlements.265  Under such
entitlements, the government controls “what is expressed via a given channel
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of communication, . . . and rights to control uses of particular expressive
content.”266
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court considered the
legality of this subcategory of speech entitlements.267  At issue was a television
broadcast “must-carry” requirement that mandated cable operators carry local
broadcasts.268  Although the Court purported to use an intermediate scrutiny
test for content-neutral regulations like the test used in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,269 the Court applied the test with “unaccustomed vigor.”270  It required
the government to bear the burden “of showing that the remedy it has adopted
does not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government’s legitimate interests.’”271  It also determined that when a
regulation implicated the First Amendment, the Court’s traditional deference
to legislative findings would not prevent the Court from exercising its own
“independent judgment of the facts.”272  On remand, the Court held that the
government had to demonstrate that Congress acted on “reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence” when enacting the must-carry provisions.273
Like the must-carry provisions, copyright also constitutes a speech
entitlement.274  As with other speech entitlements, copyright involves control
over “what is expressed via a given channel of communication” and “rights to
control uses of particular expressive content.”275  As a speech entitlement,
copyright represents a content-neutral regulation that courts should subject to
the same intermediate scrutiny with “vigor”276 test that the Court used in
Turner.277
4. Copyright Is a Prior Restraint on Publication
One of the core principles of the First Amendment holds that the
government may not prohibit the publication of materials, even if it may
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subsequently punish for that publication.278  Indeed, the Court has held that “it
has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of
the guaranty [of freedom of the press] to prevent previous restraints upon
publication.”279  This prohibition exists so that “the press would remain forever
free to censure the Government.”280  Even in instances where the potential
consequences of such publication are grave, such as possibly threatening
national security, the government may not restrain publication of the material
except in very limited circumstances.281  Copyright, however, often directly
contradicts this core First Amendment principle.  A suit for copyright
infringement empowers a court to enjoin publication and dissemination of the
infringing works.282  Commentators have argued that copyright actually favors
prior restraints because courts often presume a plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury should the infringement occur.283  
Not all courts, however, have followed this presumption.  The Eleventh
Circuit recognized copyright’s effect as a prior restraint, and briefly reversed
a lower court action on the grounds that an injunction prohibiting publication
of an allegedly infringing book “amount[ed] to an unlawful prior restraint in
violation of the First Amendment.”284  Despite this temporary recognition of
copyright as a prior restraint, no other court appears to have addressed this
argument.285
C. Mashups and the Failure of Traditional Forms of Scrutiny
If courts adopted one of the above forms of scrutiny, such scrutiny would
probably not provide mashups with any meaningful protection.  Even under
a level of heightened scrutiny, courts would likely still find copyright to
comprise the type of narrowly tailored, substantial government interest needed
to overcome heightened scrutiny.286  Indeed, the Court has already ruled on the
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importance of this interest and determined that derivative works rights create
incentives for authors to produce.287  Additionally, the Court continues to
assume that current copyright law still follows the “traditional contours” of
copyright, despite copyright’s dramatic expansion in scope and duration.
Given copyright’s constitutional mandate, and the continued reluctance by the
Court to recognize the changes copyright has undergone, the government
would likely still meet its burden even under a more rigorous First Amendment
scrutiny.
Eldred v. Ashcroft provides further evidence of the failure of traditional
heightened scrutiny to provide First Amendment protections to copyright.288
In Eldred, the Court specifically rejected applying the heightened scrutiny of
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC to the Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA).289  In so doing, the Court determined that copyright merely
“protects authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation.”290  As
such, laws like the CTEA do “not raise the free speech concerns present when
the government compels or burdens the communication of particular facts or
ideas.”291  The Court’s continued reliance on the assumed “built-in free speech
safeguards,”292 including the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use,
demonstrate the Court is unlikely to ever subject copyright to higher scrutiny
in favor of the First Amendment.
Although current First Amendment jurisprudence does not provide a
mechanism to give mashups meaningful protection from copyright, such a
mechanism would be desirable to promote First Amendment values.
Fundamentally, denying mashups the protection of the First Amendment
undercuts both the expressive goals of the First Amendment and copyright’s
promised expansive marketplace of ideas.
V. Expression Denied:  How Mashups Could Serve First Amendment Goals
As explained in Part II.B, mashups enable people to engage in commentary
regarding a variety of current affairs.  This Part will examine how the failure
of copyright law to promote, or even allow, such creations serves to inhibit
First Amendment interests.  Specifically, current copyright law stifles both
political dissent and the marketplace of ideas by making mashups
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“presumptively illegal.”293  Further, the current trend towards strong copyright
regulations serves to perpetuate itself, thereby making a balanced copyright
system that promotes creativity and expression increasingly difficult to
achieve.
A. Suppression of Political Discussion
The Internet gives people the opportunity to communicate in ways never
before enjoyed by large portions of society, both in terms of content creation
and potential audience size.294  Web logs, otherwise known as “blogs,”
exemplify this phenomenon.  Rather than creating blogs for profit motives,
most individuals create them as amateur endeavors in order to engage in
discourse about current events.295  The low cost and wide availability of
blogging technology make it possible for anyone to publish his or her own
ideas, rendering blogging markedly different from traditional print media.296
As one scholar observed about blogs, “[t]his speech affects democracy. . . .  As
more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in writing, that
will change the way people understand public issues.”297  Additionally,
blogging carries greater communicative potential than making a speech in the
town square.  Unlike the town square, blogging allows asynchronous
expression of beliefs and gives multiple people the opportunity to engage in
discourse without having to gather in a particular place at a particular time.298
Video mashups present an even more exciting opportunity for creative
political discourse than blogging.  Via the Internet, not only do mashups allow
for the same audience reach as blogs, but mashups facilitate expression in an
entirely new manner.  Not limited to text, a mashup creator can express a
message by combining text, audio, images, and video together within a single
mashup.  Further, mashups allow creators to take familiar cultural symbols and
re-appropriate them to give these symbols new meaning.  As a result, mashups
can form expression more powerful than expression created using words alone.
For example, consider the mashup video Loose Change.  Loose Change
involves the events surrounding the September 11th attacks on the World
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Trade Center and the Pentagon.299  The creators of the mashup made it with the
purpose of showing “that the United States Government was, at the very least,
criminally negligent in allowing the attacks of September 11th, 2001 to
occur.”300  The mashup combines video, audio, text, and images from
numerous sources to present a story that disputes the official explanations of
the September 11th attack.  Although Loose Change presents a controversial
message, the audio-visual elements combined in the mashup likely enhance
Loose Change’s impact on viewers.301  Seeing the videos that the creators use
as evidence in their attempt to persuade audience members gives their message
greater impact than words alone could.  This enhanced impact occurs because
one can more easily judge for himself or herself whether the phenomena the
creators describe actually occurred.302  As text alone, the message would likely
lose much of its meaning.  At a minimum, if Loose Change’s creators were
relegated to explaining in text what they attempt to demonstrate through the
mashup, they would face substantial difficulties explaining their theory of a
conspiracy.  Regardless of one’s personal beliefs about the creators or their
message, mashups like Loose Change fall squarely in line with the major First
Amendment purpose of citizens criticizing the government.303
The restrictive copyright regulations currently in place, however, make it
unlikely that creators will realize the full potential of mashups in affecting
political discourse.  Although mashups such as Loose Change contain an
extensive disclaimer explaining that all the footage used is unlicensed,304 such
a disclaimer offers no protection against copyright liability.305  While limited
instances of mashup creativity like Loose Change might always exist,
copyright restrictions will continue to chill mashups that use audio-visual
elements.  This chilling effect results from the fact that copyright holders use
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copyright to punish those who mash and remix copyrighted materials.306
Ultimately, this means that the creativity used to create these messages “will
either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open.”307
B. A Less Vibrant Marketplace
Copyright restrictions impose consequences not only on political discourse,
but on the marketplace of ideas as well.  As the current generation matures,
they will find themselves in a media landscape substantially different from the
one of earlier generations.308  What was once a passive, “read only” culture
that largely consumed media has transformed into a culture of participation
that both consumes and creates information.309  Participation in this culture will
increasingly require knowledge of activities like creating mashups.  Under
existing copyright regulations, however, the law works to stifle this creative
activity and thereby restrict this type of expression.
1. Education and Media (Il)Literacy
One must have a grasp of traditional literacy skills in order to communicate
textually.  Arguably, a person can better express ideas in textual form as that
person gains more practice in reading and writing.310  This argument also
applies to media literacy, or the way “media works [and] the way it’s
constructed.”311  In fact, a growing field of academics posits that this form of
literacy bears “crucial [importance] to the next generation of our culture.”312
Fundamentally, the changing media landscape will increasingly render the
written word less important in understanding and constructing meaning.313  As
a result, text will prove insufficient for either properly expressing ideas or
having those ideas understood by others.314  Thus, training children in media
literacy skills and the audio-visual expression of the twenty-first century will
help insure that large numbers of people have the ability to express their ideas
in an effective manner.315
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/3
2007] COMMENTS 353
316. Lessig, supra note 16, at 969.
317. Id.
318. LESSIG, supra note 11, at 37.
319. Id. at 38.
320. Id. at 185.
321. Each willful violation of a person’s copyright can result in statutory damages of up to
$150,000 per incident.  As a result, a single mashup creator could potentially face millions of
dollars in liability for a mashup containing content from several copyrighted works.  See 17
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Copyright law, however, poses problems for this form of education.  The
illegality of activities like creating mashups means that “schools are not likely
to teach [such activities].”316  Further, businesses will not develop the tools to
help facilitate education in media literacy so long as these activities remain
illegal under copyright law.317  The lack of ability to obtain such an education,
either in or out of school, results in a large degree of media illiteracy.318
Consequently, people will lack the empowerment necessary to use “the
language of the twenty-first century” to express their ideas and beliefs.319
2. The Marketplace in General
Copyright’s constraint on mashups has implications not only for the
marketplace of ideas of the coming generation, but also for the current
marketplace.  Copyright chills mashup creativity.  Due to the illegality of
remixing copyrighted materials, people who would have remixed copyrighted
materials in a mashup do not do so.320  The costs, either in terms of financial
penalties for breaking the law321 or in terms of effort needed to secure the
necessary permissions to avoid infringing anyone’s copyright, present such
substantial deterrents that many people simply forgo engaging in this form of
expression.322  Accordingly, creators who would use mashups “to express
themselves differently, or criticize culture differently” will not do so if
copyright forbids them to remix and transform information into mashups.323
Until copyright changes to allow people to create mashups without having to
fear breaking the law, copyright will continue to thwart a more vibrant
marketplace of ideas.324
C. Entrenched Copyright Regulation
Copyright regulations also damage the marketplace of ideas because these
regulations tend to perpetuate themselves.  Over the past two hundred years,
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rights granted under copyright have gained strength.325  As copyright’s scope
has expanded, society has come to see the intellectual property that copyright
governs as more of a traditional property right, rather than as a limited
monopoly granted by the government.326  This shift in perception has
manifested itself as a perceived need for copyright holders to have greater
control over their intellectual property.327  Consequently, as more control
passed to copyright holders, intellectual property began to more closely
resemble the “bundle” of rights associated with traditional property.328
Further, the reasons for having copyright law treat intellectual property
differently than traditional property blurred, and as they blurred, lawmakers
had difficulty justifying the different set of rules that governed intellectual
property.329  As lawmakers now work to eliminate some of the distinctions,
justifying the remaining distinctions between intellectual property and
traditional property presents even more difficulty.330  One scholar has
described this perceived need to eliminate the differences between intellectual
property and traditional property as an “inertia” towards making copyright a
system of “perfect control.”331  Such inertia results in increased limitations on
both fair use and the public domain.332  While this inertia towards perfect
copyright control gives some people incentive to create, it ultimately denies
to many others the opportunity to engage in expression.333
Without action to limit some of these regulations, copyright law will likely
continue to transform into more of a traditional property right.334  Indeed,
members of Congress have already discussed proposals to change the duration
of copyright to “forever less one day”335 in order to comply with the
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Constitutional mandate that copyright be granted for only  “limited [t]imes.”336
Expanded copyright control will leave expression like mashups increasingly
unproduced and unprotected because of the difficulties in obtaining the content
needed to create the mashups.337  Although scholars have proposed various
solutions to re-establish a balance between copyright and expressive interests,
these solutions seem unlikely to resolve the problems copyright poses for
mashups.
VI. Proposed Solutions Fall Short of Promoting Expression Through
Mashups
Video mashups pose unique considerations compared to other copyright
problems.  Mashups generally comprise a form of amateur creation done for
purposes of expression rather than for profit.338  Also, many mashup artists rely
on recently created content to form the materials used within the mashups.339
Furthermore, unlike cases of pure digital piracy, mashup creators transform the
materials they appropriate into a new form of expression.340  Because of these
attributes, two solutions commonly proposed by scholars will likely have little
effect in promoting and protecting mashups as a form of expression.  These
two proposals suggest either making copyright a function of time, or creating
a system of compulsory licensing that would give authors a statutory right to
use already existing copyrighted works.
A. Ticking Away the Copyright Seconds
Several proposals to reduce the control of copyright over expression suggest
altering copyright’s term by correlating a creator’s rights under copyright with
the passage of time.  These proposals have recommended reducing copyright’s
term,341 shortening the length of time for the derivative works right,342 only
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granting copyright for as long as creators formally renew their copyright,343
and making the passage of time a factor in fair use analysis.344  Although such
proposals vary in their specifics, they all attempt to reduce a copyright holder’s
rights as time passes.  While these proposals would broaden the public
domain,345 two problems will prevent time-based solutions from affording
appropriate protections to mashup creators.
First, these proposals present a problem because video mashups, especially
mashups containing social commentary or political messages, often relate to
current events.346  Because of this, mashup creators frequently rely on recently
created content in order to produce their mashups.  For example, the mashup
George Bush Doesn’t Care About Black People that used Kanye West’s
comments about how the government responded to Hurricane Katrina347 would
not benefit from making copyright a function of time.  All such time-based
proposals contemplate a period of many years of full copyright protection for
copyright holders.  This leaves creators of mashups like George Bush Doesn’t
Care About Black People with two dissatisfactory choices.  On the one hand,
if the mashup creator waits until time allows for the lawful use of the source
materials, the expression the mashup creator hopes to convey will have greatly
diminished.  Even assuming a period of protection as short as ten years, the
relevance of Hurricane Katrina will have faded, and most members of the
federal administration will no longer hold office.348
On the other hand, if the mashup creator chooses to make the mashup
within a short time of the event, then the creator will violate the shortened
copyright term.  In the case of George Bush Doesn’t Care About Black People,
the creation of all the relevant source materials in the mashup occurred only
a short time before the creation of the mashup itself.  In order for mashup
artists to express their beliefs about current events, they will often have to use
materials produced contemporaneously with those events.  Even with a
shortened term for copyright protection, however, use of these materials by
mashup creators will still violate copyright.
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Second, these proposals present a problem because creators have no way to
tell when the term of copyright protection begins.349  Previous versions of the
Copyright Act required certain registration formalities in order for copyright
to protect a work.350  The current Act, however, requires no such formalities.351
Instead, a work receives protection the moment the author has “fixed” the
expression to some type of medium.352  This means that if a mashup creator
wants to include a portion of a video in a mashup, the creator might not have
an easy way to tell when copyright protection on the video began.
Accordingly, if the creator does not know when protection began, the creator
also cannot determine when it ends.  Even if a mashup creator wanted to
follow copyright’s strictures and respect a shortened copyright term, the
absence of registration formalities makes it difficult for the creator to do so.
B. License to Mash
Another proposal to limit the power of copyright holders over
transformative works involves creating a system of compulsory licensing.353
Under such a system, those who wanted to use copyrighted materials in
making their own creation would pay either a fee or a portion of revenues to
the copyright holders, depending on if the creation was commercial or non-
commercial.354  Further, some proposals suggest allowing copyright holders to
“opt out” of the compulsory licensing system, thereby preventing their works
from being compulsorily licensed.355  Unlike current copyright law, a
compulsory licensing system contemplates the elimination of the copyright
holder’s ability to refuse consent for the new creation.356  Creators of new
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materials “will be entitled to create their works [using the copyrighted
materials], but will risk being held liable to the original creator.”357  Indeed, the
Copyright Act already embraces a similar compulsory license for musicians
who record covers of copyrighted songs.358  Compulsory licensing would allow
mashup creators potentially greater access to materials by removing the
copyright holder’s ability to refuse consent.  For three reasons, however, this
proposal still does not provide mashup creators the optimum ability to engage
in expression.
First, a compulsory licensing system increases the costs of producing a
mashup.  Certainly, a compulsory licensing system could decrease the
transactional costs of negotiating with individual copyright holders for the
rights to transform their works.359  This advantage, however, would only
provide nominal benefits.  Because most mashup creators do not seek
authorization to produce their mashups, these creators already suffer no
transaction costs.360  Notwithstanding any minimal savings that might result
from lowered transaction costs, compulsory licensing would nevertheless
increase the production costs of a mashup.361  Especially in cases where a
mashup creator assembles a mashup from many copyrighted materials, the
creator would face licensing costs so significant that the costs could deter the
creator from making the mashup.362
Second, a system of compulsory licensing might deter creators from making
mashups by denying them the ability to engage in anonymous speech.  The
Court has repeatedly recognized the importance that anonymous speech serves
in the achievement of First Amendment goals.363  In fact, the Court has even
explained that, at least in terms of literary works, “having anonymous works
enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest
in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.”364  A compulsory licensing
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system, however, would circumvent this principle by requiring mashup artists
to disclose their identity in order to comply with the law.  Indeed, a corollary
of licensing copyrighted materials requires a person to receive a license.  This
license can only have effect if issued to the person or entity who will use the
licensed work.365  Moreover, the Copyright Office will have to keep records
of which people have a proper license to use copyrighted materials.366  As a
result, based on the materials in a mashup, someone could easily determine
who made the mashup.
For example, viewers of the mashup George Bush Doesn’t Care About
Black People know the creators only by their Internet monikers of The Black
Lantern and The Legendary KO.367  If the creators complied with a compulsory
licensing system, however, someone could determine the creators’ identities
with relative ease by searching the licensing database for people who had
licensed all the various video and audio clips used in the mashup.
Consequently, mashup creators would encounter difficulties if they tried to
engage in anonymous expression.  In fairness, a determined investigator might
still discover the identities of mashup creators even without the aid of
compulsory licensing records.368  Nonetheless, increased ability to determine
a mashup creator’s identity in a relatively quick and easy manner using such
records would serve to discourage mashup creators from engaging in
expression within the confines of the compulsory licensing system.
Finally, a compulsory licensing system that allowed copyright holders to
“opt out,” would make the system highly ineffective.  Several companies
control a large percentage of media in the United States.369  This control would
enable these companies to exclude a large portion of available content from the
licensing system.  Indeed, given that many of these companies have previously
pushed for greater control over their copyrighted materials,370 mass opting-out
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373. See David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative
Critical Appropriation, in DUKE CONFERENCE ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOCUS PAPER
DISCUSSION DRAFTS 130, 130-31 (2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/
langeand.pdf (advocating expanding transformative use to cover socially critical works);
Netanel, supra note 337, at 376-82 (discussing possible implications of expanding
by these companies seems likely.  Hence, a compulsory licensing system with
an “opt out” feature will only provide minimal benefits to mashup creators
because media companies would likely exclude from the system a substantial
amount of the content mashup creators could use.
While neither altering the length of copyright’s term nor implementing a
compulsory licensing system will offer any substantial benefits to mashups,
achieving a system that seeks to promote mashups would enhance expression.
Although not recognized as fair use under the standards adopted in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court should nonetheless recognize mashups as
a form of transformative expression.371  By altering Campbell’s test to better
accommodate transformative works, virtually all mashups would receive the
protections of fair use.
VII. Reshaping Transformation and Fair Use to Protect Mashups
The Court must modify its approach to transformation and fair use to insure
an adequate balance between copyright and the expressive interests of the First
Amendment. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court stopped short
of granting all transformative works fair use protection.372  As a result, this
decision created a situation where works like mashups, which transform
original copyrighted materials but do not necessarily do it in a way that
criticize the original materials, do not receive the protection of fair use.  The
Court should alter Campbell’s test to (1) treat all works except those making
only nominal transformations as transformative, and (2) to treat transformative
works as presumptively protected by fair use.
A. Altering Campbell to Promote Transformation
1. Finding Transformation in More Works
Several scholars have proposed altering the fair use doctrine to give
transformation a more prominent place in determining whether a work
constitutes fair use.373  Nevertheless, these proposals generally limit a finding
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of transformation to instances where the creator of the transformative work has
engaged in “social commentary.”374  Such an interpretation of transformation
does go beyond Campbell by deeming a larger array of works
transformative,375 but, even so, this interpretation still leaves a large portion of
works, such as mashups made for entertainment purposes, outside the
protection of fair use.  In order for such non-socially critical works to be
protected, courts should treat all works that engage in new expression, with the
exception of those only making nominal transformations, as transformative.
By applying this interpretation, courts would find most works that make
modifications to the original materials transformative rather than infringing
derivative works.  When a court decides a copyright infringement case, it
would examine the allegedly infringing work to see if the copyrighted
materials in the work constitute “raw materials” for building new
expression.376  If the creator used the copyrighted materials in such a manner,
the type of new expression engaged in by the creator would not matter.  In
fact, the creator of the allegedly infringing work could have expressed
profound social commentary or mere entertainment and the court would
nonetheless find transformation in the work.  This interpretation of
transformation not only provides broader protection for transformative works
than currently exists under Campbell,377 but also avoids two problems that
occur under proposals that only expand protection to cover works expressing
social criticism.
First, extending transformation only to works engaging in social criticism
can leave courts to struggle with questions of what type of expression the
defendant actually engaged in.  In such cases, a defendant may assert multiple
reasons why the expression constitutes social criticism, leaving the court to
grapple with the question of whether the defendant offered these explanations
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as mere “post hoc rationalizations.”378  This creates a situation closely
mirroring the problems with drawing distinctions between parody and satire
because courts would have to judge what intentions a creator harbored when
the creator engaged in the expression.379  In contrast, not limiting
transformation to socially critical works avoids this problem.  By finding
works transformative regardless of the type of expression engaged in by the
creator, courts will not have to determine a creator’s intentions in making the
new work.  Instead, the court will only have to examine whether or not the
creator actually transformed the work.
Second, by limiting transformation to socially critical works, courts will
often have to judge the worth of a work.  A creator may intend a work to
contain broad social criticism, but in the eyes of the court the creator may fail.
The creator’s work might take aim at social phenomena, but the creator may
miss the intended target.380  In such instances, courts would have to determine
whether the expression in a work truly constituted social criticism.  Although
the Court has cautioned that “it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of a
work,”381 limiting transformative protections to only socially critical works
could require judges to do just that.  By not limiting the scope of protection to
works of social criticism, courts will not serve as an arbiter of the meaning of
an expression.  Instead, expanding the scope of transformation will render the
meaning of the author’s expression inconsequential, as courts will only need
to examine a work to see if transformation occurred.
Broadening the scope of transformation does not mean that courts will find
transformation in every work that modifies existing materials.  For instance,
if the creator of a new work merely makes nominal transformations, courts
would not have to find the new work transformative.  Examples of such
nominally transformative works include cases of pure piracy that make no
transformation, and superficial transformations like changing only a few words
in a song while keeping the rest of the lyrics and melody.382  While changing
the scope of transformation eliminates much of the uncertainty currently
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Nonetheless, expanded transformation minimizes this uncertainty because the
line between transformative and non-transformative will have moved from
encompassing only parody to encompassing substantially more works that
engage in a wider variety of expression.
2. Presuming Transformation Is Fair Use
The Court in Campbell noted that “the goal of copyright, to promote science
and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”384
The Court described transformative works as essential to “the fair use
doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”385
Thus, not only must courts recognize transformation in works that change or
add meaning to old materials, but courts should also presume these works
constitute fair use in order to fulfill the constitutional purposes of copyright.
Indeed, granting such a presumption in favor of fair use for transformative
works would protect works “imbued with new expressions that criticize or
illuminate our values, assess our social institutions, satire current events, or
comment on our most notorious cultural symbols.”386  In order to realize the
expressive benefits of transformative works, courts must necessarily grant
transformative works a presumption of protection under fair use.
The presumption of fair use for transformative works does not mean that
courts would no longer inquire into the other statutory factors of fair use.
Certainly, a court could find fair use in non-transformative works through the
application of the other statutory factors of fair use.387  Further, in a case where
a court doubts that a work makes anything more than nominal transformations,
examination of the other factors would prove determinative in the court’s fair
use analysis.388  The presumption in favor of fair use means only that courts
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will apply the other fair use factors differently, not that courts will no longer
apply the other factors.
A presumption towards finding fair use in transformative works rebalances
the fair use equation.  Courts would no longer apply the fourth fair use factor
that relates to the market effects of an infringing work389 as “the most
important” factor in determining fair use.390  Instead, the first fair use factor
that analyzes the “purpose and character” of a work will assume the prominent
role in fair use analysis.391  This factor will assume prominence because courts
examine a work’s transformative nature as part of the purpose and character
of a work.392  Given copyright’s stated purpose in the Constitution to
“[p]romote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”393 this shift in importance
helps fulfill copyright’s constitutional objectives.  Furthermore, this shift in
importance comports with the Court’s analysis in Campbell that “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors . . . that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”394  Additionally, this
shift helps resolve potential conflicts between copyright and First Amendment
values.  By granting transformation heavy favor in fair use analysis, copyright
will serve to promote expression, rather than restricting it to protect a prior
creator’s market share.395  In order to fulfill copyright’s purpose, as well as
enhance First Amendment values, altering the method courts use to weigh fair
use is appropriate.
Changing Campbell to find transformation in more works and to grant these
transformative works a presumption of fair use will help restore balance to a
copyright system that has become hostile to expressive creations like mashups.
In Blanch v. Koons, the Second Circuit appears to have taken an approach
toward fair use similar to these proposals.396  Applying the Blanch analysis to
transformative works like mashups demonstrates the benefits that judicially
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implementing the suggested changes would give to mashups and similar
transformative works.
B. Applying a Transformation-Friendly Fair Use Test
1. Blanch v. Koons
In Blanch v. Koons, the Second Circuit had to determine whether fair use
protected the infringing activities of an “appropriation art[ist].”397  Defendant
Koons “culled images from advertisements” and, after modifying them,
incorporated them into a piece of art.398  The image at issue was a photograph
of women’s “feet and lower legs,”399 and Koons admitted to not seeking
permission to use the photograph.400  Koons used the photograph to serve as
“fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass
media,” not to criticize or parody the photograph itself.401  In fact, the court
recognized the satirical nature of Koons’s work when it held that Koons’s use
of the picture “may be better characterized for these purposes as satire”
because “its message appears to target the genre of which [the photograph] is
typical, rather than the individual photograph itself.”402
Although the Blanch court started by citing Campbell’s analysis regarding
transformation, the court largely departed from Campbell’s analysis.403  The
Blanch court noted that it had applied Campbell in “too many non-parody
cases” to only limit Campbell’s rationale to parody.404  Even though the court
made such a claim, it failed to cite any such “non-parody cases.”405  After
noting that Campbell’s parody limitations would not constrain it, the court
held that Koons’s satirical appropriation constituted fair use.406  The court
determined that so long as Koons had a “genuine creative rationale,”
appropriative borrowing could constitute fair use even if done for satirical
purposes.407  As a result, when a creator uses appropriated objects as “‘raw
materials’ in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives,
the [creator’s] use is transformative.”408  Thus, according to Blanch, the
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underlying expression does not determine the existence of transformative use.
Instead, the infringer need only use the appropriated items to further the
creation of some new message in order for the new work to receive fair use
protection as a transformation.409
Blanch represents a marked departure from Campbell.  In fact, the Blanch
decision largely ignored the Campbell Court’s aversion to protecting satire.410
Further, the analysis in Blanch did not base a finding of transformation on the
presence of a literary device like parody.  Rather, the Blanch court examined
if the creator used the infringing works as “raw materials” to make something
new.411  The Blanch court shifted Campbell’s focus away from the type of
expression made by the incorporation of infringing materials, and focused
instead on whether or not the creator used the materials to further different
“creative or communicative objectives.”412  Thus, Blanch’s test would find
transformation when creators incorporate materials into any new message, not
merely messages that criticize the original work.
The Blanch court’s decision to move towards a more transformation-
friendly standard represents an even greater departure from prior fair use cases
when one considers the history behind this case.  The same court that decided
Blanch had previously found that a nearly identical act of appropriation by
Koons did not constitute fair use.  In Rogers v. Koons, the court held that no
fair use existed in Koons’s satirical act of rendering a sculpture based on a
photograph.413  Although the Second Circuit decided Rogers two years before
the Supreme Court decided Campbell, the Second Circuit applied a parody-
satire distinction in Rogers almost identical to that in Campbell.414  The Rogers
court noted that “the copied work must be . . . an object of the parody,
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otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the original work.”415
Accordingly, the court reasoned that permitting fair use for satire would leave
“no real limitation on the copier’s use of another’s copyrighted work to make
a statement on some aspect of society at large.”416  The Blanch decision seems
to overturn the reasoning in Rogers by not only presuming that transformation
exists in any activity with different “creative or communicative objectives,”417
but also by broadly protecting this transformation as fair use, even when the
creator makes such transformation for satiric purposes.418  This broad,
transformation-friendly analysis represents not only a shift away from Rogers
and Campbell, but also provides a method to offer fair use protection to other
types of transformative expression, such as mashups.
2. Application of Transformation-Friendly Fair Use to Mashups
The Second Circuit’s application of a transformation-friendly fair use test
to appropriative art demonstrates how the two changes proposed in Part VII.A
could protect works like mashups.  For instance, in a case involving a mashup,
the court would examine the mashup to see if the copyright-protected works
constitute raw materials that the creator transformed into something new.  The
court would not concern itself with the type of expression made in the mashup
or if the mashup succeeds in making its point.  Instead, the court would only
examine whether the appropriated materials serve as components within the
mashup in such a way that the mashup transforms the components into some
type of new expression.  If the mashup uses the materials in such a way, the
court would find the mashup transformative.  As a transformative work, the
court would presume fair use protects the mashup unless the party claiming
infringement could rebut the presumption, such as by showing the creator
made only nominal transformations.  Consequently, most mashups that would
have previously infringed a copyright holder’s derivative works right would
now receive protection under fair use because most mashups make more than
nominal transformations.
For example, consider a hypothetical case in which Lionel Ritchie sues the
creators of the George Bush/Tony Blair mashup for infringing Ritchie’s rights
in the song Endless Love.419  The court in that case would examine the mashup
to see if the mashup creator uses the song in a way that does more than
nominally transform it.  In determining this, the court might consider if the
mashup creates new expression, if the mashup serves a different function than
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the source materials, or if the mashup comprises a work of creativity or
originality.420  The court would not consider what message the mashup
expresses, such as whether the mashup expresses political criticism.  Instead,
the court would only examine if the mashup transforms Ritchie’s copyrighted
work into something different.  If so, the court would find the mashup
transformative and presume fair use offers the mashup protection.
Additionally, consider the mashup StarLords, which would appear to
engage in substantially less social or political commentary than the Bush/Blair
mashup.421  Here again, a court would only examine if the mashup creator uses
the copyrighted works as raw materials and transforms them in more than a
nominal way.  Although StarLords appears to engage in no social criticism,
this fact would carry no weight in the court’s fair use analysis.  The court
would only consider whether StarLords’ creator transforms the mashup’s raw
materials into something new.  If so, the court would find the mashup
transformative and give the mashup a presumption of fair use.
Revising fair use to make the doctrine more accommodating to
transformative works will provide the protection of fair use to a mashup that
would otherwise infringe copyright.  This change in the fair use doctrine
proves desirable not only because it protects a larger variety of works from
suppression, but for several other reasons as well.  The proposed changes to
make the fair use doctrine more transformation-friendly help rebalance First
Amendment values against copyright.  Additionally, the proposed changes
eliminate the ambiguity of the current parody-satire distinction.  Finally,
altering the fair use doctrine to protect transformative works clarifies the
boundaries between fair use and derivative works.  The following subparts
examine these three benefits individually.
VIII. Benefits of Transforming the Fair Use Doctrine
A. Promoting Mashups Enhances First Amendment Values
Copyright and the First Amendment often conflict.  Although copyright
functions to promote expression, many scholars have argued that copyright’s
current implementation does precisely the opposite.422  For three reasons,
altering the fair use doctrine to better protect transformative works, such as
mashups, will help resolve copyright’s conflicts with the First Amendment by
ensuring that fair use will protect otherwise suppressible expression.
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First, protecting mashups enables the creator to have greater freedom in
specifically choosing the words and expressions the creator wants to use as
raw materials.  The Court has previously noted that “we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”423  Under current
copyright law, however, courts routinely prohibit speakers from using
particular words if such words infringe another’s copyright.424  Moreover,
copyright’s reach extends not only to words, but to virtually all other forms of
expression as well.425  Protecting mashups as a form of transformative use
allows the mashup creator to use otherwise protected materials, and thereby,
to have access to a wider variety of “particular” expression in constructing a
new message.  The creator of the George Bush/Tony Blair mashup426 should
not have to settle for only saying “George Bush and Tony Blair have strong
feelings for each other” in order to comport with copyright.  By protecting the
mashup with fair use, the creator can convey his own particular expression by
incorporating the song Endless Love into the mashup without having to fear
liability under copyright.
Second, protecting mashups as a form of transformative fair use decreases
self-censorship by mashup creators.  The uncertainties regarding protection of
transformative uses under the current fair use doctrine create a chilling effect
that discourages many people from creating mashups.427  Further, the amateurs
who create most mashups lack the resources to either secure permission from
copyright holders or engage in a court battle to determine if fair use protects
their mashup.428  As a result, many mashup creators simply forgo creating
mashups in the first place.429  By altering fair use so that courts will find
transformation more easily and presume that fair use protects transformative
works, copyright will no longer thwart mashup creation.  Accordingly, a
transformation-friendly fair use standard will eliminate the “prevailing
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uncertainties” of fair use that inhibit mashup creation, thereby leaving mashup
creators free to make mashups without fear of liability for copyright
infringement.430
Third, altering fair use to better accommodate transformative works
enhances the marketplace of ideas and promotes democratic discourse.
Copyright’s incentive system should strive to promote the creation of new
expression.431  Although scholars have questioned whether current copyright
law does this effectively,432 authors and creators may nonetheless receive at
least some incentive from the current copyright structure.433  Altering fair use
will only minimally impact this incentive structure, and in the case of
mashups, will have virtually no impact on the financial incentives copyright
creates.434  Indeed, a revised fair use test largely preserves the inventive
structure of copyright because mashups will seldom serve as a market
substitute for the original product.435
By altering fair use to protect mashups, additional expression and ideas will
enter the marketplace of ideas.  The Court recognized the importance of a
vibrant marketplace of ideas when it carved out a limited exception for
transformative uses in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.436  Moreover, the
Court found that creation and expression of new ideas insures diversity within
the marketplace of ideas and allows those within the marketplace exposure to
a wider variety of thoughts and expression.437  Such diversity not only
encourages more expression as people engage in continued discourse about
ideas within the marketplace, but also helps to ensure that copyright fulfills its
“democracy enhancing objectives.”438
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B. Resolving the Parody-Satire Quagmire
The parody-satire distinction that the Court used in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. has created doctrinal problems for fair use.439  This distinction has
made it unclear exactly when a court will protect a transformative work, or if
a court will even find a work transformative at all.440  Accordingly, if courts
would abolish this distinction and find a work transformative regardless of
whether the work constitutes a parody, satire, or something else entirely, courts
could eliminate the confusion bred by the parody-satire distinction.  Courts can
avoid using this ambiguous literary distinction by focusing on whether the
appropriated works in a mashup serve as raw materials to create new
expression.  In so doing, a mashup creator could more easily determine
whether a mashup made by the creator will receive fair use protection.  Thus,
elimination of this ambiguity not only clarifies the fair use doctrine, but also
reduces copyright’s negative effects on expression.441
C. Clarifying Boundaries Between Fair Use and Derivative Rights
A copyright holder’s derivative rights often directly conflict with an
infringer’s claim to fair use.442  Although the Copyright Act attempts to
balance these two competing claims, derivative rights have expanded to the
point of almost entirely consuming fair use.443  A transformation-friendly fair
use test, however, would sharply curtail a copyright holder’s derivative rights.
While this represents a change in the protections copyright offers to copyright
holders, courts should nevertheless implement this change not only to promote
the expressive values of the First Amendment, but also to follow the language
and purpose of the Copyright Act.
The Copyright Act mandates that its fair use provisions apply
“notwithstanding” a copyright holder’s derivative works right.444  Further,
derivative rights under the Act are “[s]ubject to” fair use.445  The Act, however,
also states that any work that “transforms” an original infringes the derivative
rights of the copyright holder.446  These competing provisions create a
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contradiction within the Act itself.  The Court has already determined that at
least some transformative uses fall under fair use, despite the Act stating
transformative uses belong to the copyright holder as a derivative right.447
Either the right to transform an existing copyrighted work must fall within the
scope of derivative rights as the Act states, or the right to transform must
constitute a fair use, as the Court held.  Because the Act subordinates
derivative rights to fair use rights,448 transformation should fall under fair use,
not under derivative rights.  Interpreting the Act in this way not only
eliminates a statutory conflict between derivative rights and fair use, but also
prevents derivative rights from “undermin[ing] the very viability of a
transformative-use defense in copyright law.”449
Contrary to concerns espoused by the courts,450 placing transformation
within the realm of fair use would not eviscerate derivative rights.  True, the
adoption of a transformation-friendly fair use test would lessen the derivative
rights belonging to a copyright holder.  Nonetheless, a copyright holder would
still have an array of derivative rights even under a different fair use standard,
some of which the Act specifically mentions.  For example, a copyright holder
would still have derivative rights for “editorial revisions, annotations, [and]
elaborations,”  in addition to other minimally transformative changes to the
original work.451  These modifications to the original work would generally
comprise only nominal changes that would not receive protection from the
proposed changes to transformation and fair use.452
IX. Conclusion
The Internet’s ability to serve as a digital town square represents a
remarkable opportunity for substantial numbers of people to engage in wide
and expressive discourse.453  As digital manipulation technologies increase in
affordability, mashups present a unique and effective way for Internet users to
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engage in expression.454  Nevertheless, this vision of an expressive digital
marketplace where people constantly imbue old creations with new expression
and meaning may never come to fruition.  The potential boon mashups
represent to First Amendment values stands at odds with current copyright
law.  Copyright’s heavy emphasis on the promotion of a copyright holder’s
derivative works rights serves as a major impediment to the legality of mashup
creation.455  Further, the Court’s holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
heavily limits the ability of an infringing mashup creator to claim fair use
based on transformation as a defense.456  As a result, unless courts alter
existing copyright doctrine to better accommodate transformative works,
mashup creators will increasingly find themselves and their mashups on the
wrong side of copyright.
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